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POVZETEK 
Spis analizira muzikologijo kot institucionalen 
diskurz, kot kolektivno in družbeno prakso, ki se 
ne proizvaja in preoblikuje v določenih institu-
cionalnih mrežah, temveč jo te mreže temeljito 
oblikuje. Z vztrajanjem na protislovnem statusu 
lastnega dela v razmerju do institucij, Derrida ponu-
ja muzikologom izhodišče za pogajanje s stmktura-
mi in tradicijami, ki sočasno omogočajo in zameju-
jejo njihovo delo. Problematiziranje muzikoloških 
ustanov pa zastavlja vprašanja, ki presegajo 
neposredno vsebino dekonstrukcije in objemajo 
tako različna polja, kot so psihoanaliza, politična 
filozofija, sociologija in, med drugim, retoriko 
humanističnih ved. 
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ABSTRACT 
This essay analyzes musicology as an institutional 
discourse, as a collective and social practice that is 
not only produced and transmitted within particu-
lar institutional networks, but is also profoundly 
shaped by those networks. By insisting on the para-
doxical status of his own work vis-a-vis institutions, 
Derrida might provide an opening for musicologists 
to negotiate with the structures and traditions that 
simultaneously enable and constrain their work. 
The problematizing of musicological institutions, 
however, raises questions that go beyond the 
immediate purview of deconstruction to embrace 
fields as diverse as psychoanalysis, political philos-
ophy, sociology, and the rhetoric of the human sci-
ences, among others. 
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As a musicologist, I am a parasite, or at least I aspire to be. A major concern of my recent 
work involves analyzing humanistk disciplines, including musicology, as institutional dis-
courses, as social and collective practices that are not only produced and transmitted within 
particular institutional networks, but are also profoundly shaped by those networks, by their 
traditions and expectations, their communal desires, and their criteria for success. Academic 
musicology is a cultural industry that generates discourse about music in a variety of genres 
both oral (lectures, seminars, conference presentations, oral examinations) and written (disser-
tations, monographs, scholarly editions of music, articles, conference abstracts, books reviews, 
and so on). Yet this proliferation of words, which is only likely to increase with the growing 
professionalization of the field, is not without its problems. Rose Rosengard Subotnik, for exam-
ple, who is certainly among the most astute observers of the current scene, describes "doubts, 
even a pervasive anxiety, about the status and future of writing" within the field today. This 
anxiety is part of what is driving what she calls "the Next Paradigm," in which the stakes 
involve "not just the legitimacy of any individual scholar's work but the future of musical schol-
arship itself" (Subotnik 2004: 291-92). Given these concerns, it would seem urgent to examine 
musicology as a site of textual production. 
By taking discourse about music as my object of study, to see how an academic discipline 
frames music as a discursive object, my work is parasitic upon existing scholarship; it is musi-
cology of the second order. In this respect, my project has obvious affinities with various 
modes of deconstruction, and particularly with Derrida's practice, since "his work is always car-
ried out in relation to texts by others, in their singularity" (Bennington / Derrida 1993: 84). Thus 
I am less interested in "applying" deconstruction directly to the analysis of musical composi-
tions than in learning how to read musicological texts for something other than their informa-
tional content. Although Derrida is certainly not my only point of departure here, what draws 
me to him is his ability to integrate bold conjectures with patient fidelity to textual details. Lacan 
sometimes compared the work of psychoanalytic interpretation to pulling a rabbit out of a hat 
(Lacan 1992: 284), but such wizardry resembles the familiar drawing of a duck that becomes a 
rabbit when looked at awry, disclosing what was hidden in plain sight. And this quality is what 
I admire in Derrida's exegeses (or in Lacan's, for that matter). 
Just as recent work in political philosophy, at least since the groundbreaking work of Laclau 
and Mouffe, (Laclau / Mouffe 1985), has recognized the problem of language as central, so 
understanding what we might call the politics of disciplinarity must also foreground language. 
But these problems must not be understood in the narrow sense of quibbles over words, but 
as problems of discourse, which I follow Lacan in regarding as "a social link founded on lan-
guage" (Lacan 1998: 17). Here Lyotard's understanding of culture as "an expanded field of lan-
guage games" also provides a valuable orientation (Readings 1991: 109). If we situate musicol-
ogy within this expanded field, it can be productively viewed as a collection of overlapping 
language games, related by what Wittgenstein calls "family resemblances," and overlapping 
with innumerable other language games, including not only less academic ways of talking 
about music, but also with other cultural practices and forms of life. This allows musicology to 
embrace things like oral traditions of musical pedagogy, and to acknowledge the performative 
aspects of its own writing, the moments when musicology shades into poetry. Non-verbal 
behavior associated with music also belongs to this expanded field; applause at concerts, for 
example, is a cultural practice that can take on different meanings depending on the ensemble 
of language games into which it is integrated. Reconstructing musicology in these terms offers 
an anti-essentialist approach to disciplinarity, keeping the object of the discipline open. Since 
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defining "music" is itself a language game, there is not need to limit what music is or might 
become, or for that matter to limit the scope of musicology. 
Foregrounding the language games of musical scholarship does not by any means entail 
ignoring musical sounds, or abandoning the traditional concern of musicology with musical 
experience. Here we must recall that Wittgenstein's breakthrough was to integrate language 
with its social environment, combining "human beings, a world-setting, and language into a 
single complex of meaning" (Finch 1995: 44; emphasis original). In Wittgenstein's well-known 
example of the builder and his apprentice, the bricks and slabs that the builder demands are 
an integral part of the language game, as Laclau and Mouffe correctly insist (Laclau / Mouffe 
1985: 108). Musicological discourse often cites musical events, whether simply by mentioning 
them, or by quoting them in whole or in part. In the classroom, for example, teachers may 
punctuate their lectures with live or recorded performances, perhaps singing or playing the 
piano, playing CDs, or writing examples in musical notation on the blackboard. In publica-
tions these examples often appear in musical notation, although more and more books now 
have CDs attached to them, and with the increase in internet publishing the use of recorded 
examples is likely to increase. These musical examples are an integral part of the language 
games musicologists play. But sound is reframed and recontextualized in musical scholarship; 
the range of meanings changes as sounds are grafted into new contexts. If we follow the Stoics 
(as Deleuze and Guattari do) in dividing the world into bodies and incorporeals, one might say 
that the body of musical sound undergoes a series of incorporeal transformations in musical 
discourse (Deleuze / Guattari 1987: 86). 
The realization that statements about music are events within an ongoing disciplinary and 
cultural conversation without which they cannot fully be understood forces us to confront insti-
tutional questions of the sort that Derrida increasingly posed in his later phases, particularly as 
issues of ethics and politics came to the foreground of his attention. Just as philosophy cannot 
be separated from its writing, so it cannot be detached from the concrete circumstances of its 
production and circulation; in dismantling philosophical oppositions, deconstruction "immedi-
ately concerns, just as much and just as radically, the institutional structures founded on such 
oppositions" (Derrida 2Q()2: 33). His awareness of these systemic factors was certainly 
enhanced by the prejudices that shaped the reception of his work, including not only the resis-
tance to deconstruction but also the sometimes giddy embrace of certain curious distortions of 
it. He was irked, for example, by the often rigid barriers between the so-called Continental and 
analytic traditions in philosophy, and by the related prejudice that classified him as a predom-
inantly literary rather than a philosophical figure, and that interpreted his persistent interroga-
tion of the limits between philosophy and literature as a confusion of the two, or as a rejection 
of such distinctions (Derrida 2005: 142). 
Musicology may reproduce some of the same institutional prejudices that plagued Derrida 
(while introducing some new ones of its own). Consider, for example, recent developments in 
the field of the cognitive psychology of music, which has produced a distinguished a body of 
work, including the contributions of Fred Lerdahl, Larry Zbikowski, Gavin Chuck, and others. 
An important strain of this research has drawn on the insights of the philosopher Mark Johnson, 
both in his independent work and his collaboration with George Lakoff, on such topics as the 
so-called embodied mind, image schemata, cross-domain mapping, and so forth. Within an 
American context, the originality of Johnson's work may well depend on his receptivity to both 
analytic and Continental perspectives, and he even admits that "it will be obvious that some of 
my most important claims are anticipated in the work of philosophers who might legitimately 
claim allegiance to phenomenology of the post-Husserlian varieties" (Johnson 1987: xxxvii). Yet 
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the musical reception of his work has taken place within an institutional framework largely if 
unconsciously dominated by Anglo-American empiricism in method and philosophical outlook, 
so that Johnson' s Continental affinities and debts have been overlooked by his own most pas-
sionate readers. As a further irony, Johnson himself seems constrained by the audience he envi-
sions for his work, so that his range of references is dominated by the analytic tradition, and 
his debt to phenomenology is rarely addressed or made explicit. And here we see the greatest 
danger posed by institutional prejudices: far from being merely external differences, the oppo-
sition between factions often appears as an interna! blockage or impediment within a single 
school of thought (Korsyn 2003). 
By insisting on the paradoxical status of his own work vis-a-vis institutions, Derrida might 
provide a model for musicologists to negotiate with the structures and traditions that simulta-
neously enable and constrain their work: "Deconstruction is an institutional practice jor which 
the concept oj institution remains a problem" (Derrida 2002: 53; emphasis original). For me this 
formulation recalls Heidegger's statement that "Dasein exists as an entity for which, in its Being, 
that Being is itself an issue" (Heidegger 1962: 458). Institutions, whether we consider the fam-
ily, the state, the university, law, religion, literature, or whatever, are our collective modes of 
being in the world, our collaborative ways of being human, and Derrida seeks to problematize 
them rather than destroy them, so that their authority remains permanently in question. 
Musicology has a rich legacy of institutions, including not only the basic infrastructure of aca-
demic departments, professional organizations, and publishers that supports scholarship, but 
also a sophisticated network of investigative methods and genres of writing that exert an insti-
tutional force. Since there can be no organized study of music-or of anything else, for that mat-
ter-without institutions, it would be absurd to simply jettison them and start over. What we can 
do, however, is to foster institutions that resist their own authority. 
A deconstructive musicology, then, if we can imagine such a thing, might seek the same 
s01t of relationship with academic musicology that deconstruction seeks with philosophy, a 
relation of neither complete identity nor complete difference, neither inside nor outside exist-
ing institutions, operating in the margins between discourses, and parasitic upon existing schol-
arship. 
2 
Here it is urgent not only to examine the various institutional spaces within which musi-
cology bas historically functioned, but also to identify potential conflicts among those spaces, 
since these can produce contradict01y demands on disciplines. Such contradictions have little 
to do with the flaws of individual scholars; here it is a question of recognizing what Barbara 
Johnson calls the intentionality of systemic, institutional discourses [. .. ] to analyze the func-
tioning of different, sometimes incommensurable, kinds of intentions (Johnson 1994: 48; 
emphasis original). 
Such analyses may reverse the relation between margins and center in academic discourse, 
calling attention to factors that might seem peripheral from the standpoint of someone who 
wants to read musicological texts far purely informational content. 
One potential source of conflicting values in musical research may be the sometimes awk-
ward perch it occupies between the university and the conservatory, the one committed to the 
pursuit of knowledge, the other to the cultivation of music as an art, craft, or practical activity. 
The slow and begrudging acceptance of music as an academic discipline, epitomized by the 
remark attributed to a president of Harvard in the nineteenth centu1y that "there's no such thing 
as musicology, one might as well speak of grandmotherology," continues to produce effects. 
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Many in the field, for example, wonder if musicology will always be a "belated discipline," and 
such anxieties can produce all sorts of imaginary rivalries and identifications as musicologists 
try to establish their academic legitimacy. Y et the discipline also remains vulnerable to charges 
that it is irrelevant to the activity of practical musicianship. These conflicting demands can pro-
duce a see-saw effect as musicologists alternately try to satisfy the demands for academic rigor 
and musical spontaneity (Korsyn 2003: 64). 
The double institutional location of musicology recalls the special position of philosophy 
that Derrida finds in Kant's plan for the university, in which philosophy is both one department 
among others but also the discipline that interrogates the grounds of all disciplines (Derrida 
2003: 106). Although contained within the larger whole of the university, philosophy is also a 
part that exceeds the whole. In similar fashion, as an academic department with ties to musi-
cal practice, musicology is both inside and outside the university. This sort of conflict can pro-
duce both positive and negative effects, and I have argued that musicologists should embrace 
their marginality and exploit it. 
One factor that might turn marginality into an advantage is that the university is itself a 
divided institution, a structure that may Jack an obvious center, in part because its traditional 
alibis, the narratives that once justified its mission and gave unity and purpose to its separate 
activities, no longer compel assent. We seem to inhabit what Bill Readings calls "the universi-
ty in ruins" (Readings 1996). Readings traces a series of models that have provided a rationale 
for the university beginning with what he calls the Kantian University of Reason, through the 
University of Culture, which he associates with Wilhelm von Humboldt's widely imitated plan 
for the University of Berlin in the early nineteenth century, up to the contemporary University 
of Excellence, which he links to the globa! economy and the increasing professionalization of 
the academy. Although he sees this pursuit of a vaguely defined "excellence" as the dominant 
model today, the earlier visions of the university continue to exert an influence, if sometimes 
only in the form of nostalgia for an idealized past. 
The coexistence of these models exposes the university to any number of competing insti-
tutional pressures, from the state to the globa! economy. In the University of Culture, for exam-
ple, the mission of the university was to produce a national subject or consciousness by assim-
ilating a particular culture, so that national literatures became central to the curriculum. This 
effectively prepared a place for musicology long before it became a university department at 
most institutions, and the emphasis that German musicology has often given to describing 
national styles is a predictable consequence of its trying to adapt to the University of Culture. 
One source of unease among scholars may be their pursuit of such a research agenda after the 
cultural consensus underlying it has collapsed, particularly as the globa! information economy 
forces universities to look beyond their national horizons. 
The problematizing of musicological institutions raises a number of questions that go 
beyond the immediate purview of deconstruction to embrace fields as diverse as psychoanaly-
sis, political philosophy, the sociology of knowledge, and the rhetoric of inquiry, among oth-
ers. Some of the most pressing questions involve psychoanalytic questions of identification, 
anxiety, fantasy, desire, and jouissance. How, for example, do individuals come to identify with 
particular institutions? How do institutions arouse and sustain desire? How do identifications 
with academic institutions relate to our lives outside the academy? How do these affect the 
type of knowledge that is produced? And what about the passions? Musicological discourse 
is replete with avowals of love for music, and it is tempting to idealize the discipline as a pure 
search for knowledge, driven by selfless love. But Lacan spoke of love, hate, knowledge, and 
ignorance as the four passions. What role might the passion for ignorance play in academic 
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institutions? I do not mean the bone-headed type of ignorance, of course, but the carefully cul-
tivated ignorance of those who defend their knowledge with indefatigable industry. And what 
if musicologists hate music as much as they love it? Might musicology be a defense against the 
overwhelming jouissance in music? 
These questions of identification and the formation of groups lead rapidly to questions of 
a political nature: How do academic institutions legitimate themselves? How do they resem-
ble or differ from other political institutions? How does the antagonistk structure of society 
affect musicology? It is significant, for example, if seldom remarked on, that professional orga-
nizations in the humanities operate according to democratic principles, resembling miniature 
republics with constitutions and by-laws, elected officers and boards. As I have shown else-
where, their attempt to provide a forum for an ongoing disciplinary conversation tends to 
reproduce what Chantal Mouffe calls "the democratic paradox," involving an irreducible ten-
sion between the liberal desire for individual rights and tolerance and the democratic desire for 
equality and the rule of the people. The ideal of blind peer review is an attempt to articulate 
the democratic desire for free and open discussions in which equality among the participants 
will prevail with the liberal desire for tolerance and respect for individual differences. As in 
society at large, the demos must be constituted through exclusions, since many conference pro-
posals are rejected; in this disciplinary democracy, only experts may participate. At the same 
tirne, however, the constitution of the peer review group is open to challenges, to arguments 
that decisions have been made unfairly or differences have been ignored. This has been the 
case, for example, with the participation of women in the American Musicological Society, as 
Suzanne Cusick has shown. The formation of that learned body in the 1930's involved the 
forceful exclusion of women, and the gradual recognition of women within the organization 
resulted from liberal challenges to the constitution of the community (Cusick 1999: 471-72). But 
what constitutes difference at any given tirne, or which differences matter, is subject to debate, 
because such disagreements may involve what Zizek calls "metadifferences," differences about 
the nature of differences. In the case of Christianity and Islam, for example, they do not sim-
ply disagree; they "disagree about their very disagreement" (Zizek 2000: 315). 
A distinctively deconstructive approach to these questions might begin by exploring the 
conditions of possibility-which for Derrida are also the conditions of impossibility-for institu-
tions to take the forms they do. Since ali disciplines tend to define their objects of study 
through a series of exclusions, the potential arises for musicology to reproduce the pattern of 
hierarchical oppositions that Derrida finds in Western metaphysics. In attempting to differenti-
ate music from what it is not, for example, musicians have often invoked a contrast between 
sounds of definite pitch and those without definite pitch. By classifying the latter as noise, 
scholars have often tried to draw a boundary around music, excluding or at least regulating the 
use of noise. This is what Rameau does, for example, when he begins his Treatise on Harmony 
with a succinct definition of music: "Music is the science of sounds; therefore sound is the 
principal subject of music" (Rameau 1971 [1722]: 3). This definition already implies a discipli-
nary space for any future musicology, separating musical sound from noise to delineate a clear 
object of study, and differentiating science from non-science to provide a method. (There is a 
science of noise, but for Rameau this is not music.) By contrast, consider Jacques Attali's def-
inition of music as "the organization of noise,'' a definition that effectively dismantles Rameau's 
hierarchy between sound and noise and gestures toward a possible deconstruction (Attali 1985: 
1). (See Korsyn 2003: 125-30 for a fuller discussion). 
One might consider any number of other binary oppositions that circulate in discourse 
about music, including those between musical sound and musical notation, Western versus 
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non-Westem music, individual composition versus historical context, and so on, ali of which 
can provide a foothold for institutions. The subdisciplines of music theory and music history, 
for example, rely on the text/context distinction to differentiate their primary objects of study; 
theorists generally privilege the individual composition, while historians privilege the context. 
But as I have shown elsewhere, this opposition is vulnerable to deconstruction (see Korsyn 
1993, 1999, 2003, 2004). 
3 
The need for us to rethink the nature of musicological institutions becomes urgent given 
the deadlocks and impasses that seem to prevail in contemporary musicological discourse. To 
amplify this point, it may be helpful to see how one thoughtful musicologist perceives the state 
of the discipline today. Here is how Mitchell Morris begins a recent article: 
Musicological tempers were short in the 90's, and only recently seem to have settled into a 
sullenness that stili occasionally flares into rancor. Many thoughtful and serious scholars 
hold incommensurate points of view with great conviction and vehemence, and find little 
success in persuading opponents or often even in eliminating smaller disagreements 
between their own positions and those of their philosophical allies. Joumals, newsletters, 
internet sites, even some of the (quasi-) mass media, ali register this intellectual conflict, 
and AMS presidents and others have frequently spoken out in attempts to reconcile the var-
ious segments of the field, or at least to establish more moderate tones of discussion. As 
society has gone, so has the Society: everyone's feelings, it seems, are especially delicate 
around the tum of the millennium (Morris 2004: 48) 
Although Morris considers the advantages of conflict as a lever for progress in generating 
competition and debate, he also identifies conflict of a different and more disturbing order, an 
intractable sort that stifles debate because the practitioners disagree about fundamental values. 
He concludes that "it is incumbent upon us as scholars to seek some way out of this dilemma" 
(Morris 2004: 49). 
Morris's diagnosis of an ethical dilemma in musical scholarship circa 2004 independently 
supports a position I had advanced in a book published the previous year, in which I spoke 
of a Tower of Babe!, a fragmentation of musical research into ever smaller factions, each char-
acterized by its own language and value system, making communication outside of one's area 
of specialization more and more difficult. Although the proliferation of languages in the Tower 
of Babe! has a liberating potential, there is also a danger that it will tum into its opposite, 
because of the pressure towards uniformity and standardization within the managed universi-
ty CI call this tendency toward uniformity the Ministry of Truth, a name I adopt from the pro-
paganda ministry in Orwell's 1984). It is difficult for some musicologists to face these problems, 
and Morris notes that his suggestion that "our discipline would benefit from deliberate attempts 
to invent (or at least revive) some varieties of moral criticism" has often been greeted "with 
some variety of skepticism, dismissal, and even disgust" (Morris 2004: 49). 
Faced with such a dilemma, a radical rethinking of musicological institutions that includes 
some aspects of deconstruction might enable us to see the frequent complicity of opposing 
positions, in which the apparent conflict between different schools of thought often masks an 
interna! impediment or blockage within each single position. By analyzing the effects of par-
ticipating in conflicting institutional discourses, we might better leam to manage these effects. 
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